Migration and Social Insurance

Cremer, Helmuth and Goulão, Catarina (2011) Migration and Social Insurance. TSE Working Paper, n. 11-217

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/24008

Abstract

A wide variety of social protection systems coexist within the EU. Some member states provide social insurance that is of Beveridgean inspiration (with universal and more or less flat benefits), while others offer a system that is mainly Bismarckian (with benefits related to past contributions). Labor mobility raises concerns about the sustainability of the most generous and redistributive (Beveridgean) insurance systems. We address this issue in a two-country setting, where individuals differ in mobility cost (attachment to their native country). A Bismarckian insurance system is not affected by migration while a Beveridgean one is. Our results suggest that the race-to-the-bottom affecting tax rates may be more important under Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck competition. Finally, we study the strategic choice of the type of social protection. We show that Bismarckian governments may find it beneficial to adopt a Beveridgean insurance system.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: January 2011
JEL codes: H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H70 - General
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:03
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:24008
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3560

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