Local Identification in Empirical Games of Incomplete Information

Florens, Jean-Pierre and Sbaï, Erwann (2009) Local Identification in Empirical Games of Incomplete Information. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-166

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/22819

Abstract

This paper studies identification for a broad class of empirical games in a general functional setting. Global identification results are known for some specific models, for instance in some standard auction models. We use functional formulations to obtain general criteria for local identification. These criteria can be applied to both parametric and nonparametric models, as well as models with asymmetry among players and affiliated private information. A benchmark model is developed where the structural parameters of interest are the distribution of private information and an additional dissociated parameter, such as a parameter of risk aversion. Criteria are derived for some standard auction models, games with exogenous variables, games with randomized strategies, such as mixed strategies, and games with strategic functions that cannot be derived analytically.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: July 2009
JEL codes: C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods - General
C10 - General
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods
C79 - Other
D44 - Auctions
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:02
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:22819
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3385

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