Arm's length relationships without moral hazard

Crémer, Jacques (2009) Arm's length relationships without moral hazard. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-111

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/21974

Abstract

I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 16 November 2009
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:01
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:21974
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3288

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