Jeon, Doh-Shin and Menicucci, Domenico (2009) Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-069, Toulouse

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Abstract

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affects competition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.
Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze the consequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 27 July 2009
Place of Publication: Toulouse
JEL Classification: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing
K21 - Antitrust Law
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L82 - Entertainment; Media (Performing Arts, Visual Arts, Broadcasting, Publishing, etc.)
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:00
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:36
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:21960
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3272

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