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Garrett, Daniel F. and Dilmé, Francesc (2019) Residual Deterrence. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1029, Toulouse
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Abstract
Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring specialized staff, undertaking targeted research and coordinating personnel. We illustrate how our model can be used to address a number of policy questions regarding the optimal design of enforcement authorities.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2019 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | deterrence, reputation, switching costs |
| JEL Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Universtité Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Jul 2019 06:31 |
| Last Modified: | 25 Jul 2019 12:39 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:123218 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32641 |
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