Residual Deterrence

Garrett, Daniel F. and Dilmé, Francesc (2019) Residual Deterrence. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1029, Toulouse

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Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring specialized staff, undertaking targeted research and coordinating personnel. We illustrate how our model can be used to address a number of policy questions regarding the optimal design of enforcement authorities.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: July 2019
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: deterrence, reputation, switching costs
JEL Classification: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Universtité Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 23 Jul 2019 06:31
Last Modified: 25 Jul 2019 12:39
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