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Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study

Blais, André, Laslier, Jean-François, Sauger, Nicolas and Van Der Straeten, Karine (2009) Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-065

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/21952

Abstract

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (in two-round elections) or they just vote sincerely (in single transferable vote elections).

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: July 2009
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:00
Last Modified: 02 Oct 2019 23:00
["eprint_fieldname_oai_identifier" not defined]: oai:tse-fr.eu:21952
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3260

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