Risk-Aversion and Prudence in Rent-Seeking Games

Treich, Nicolas (2009) Risk-Aversion and Prudence in Rent-Seeking Games. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-013

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/22139

Abstract

This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking
game. It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always
decrease rent-seeking efforts. These conditions hold for any regular
contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also
prudent. Under n = 2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared
to risk-neutrality. An intuition for this result is given based on a
self-protection model.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: French
Date: 17 February 2009
Uncontrolled Keywords: risk-aversion, rent-seeking, lobbying, uncertainty
JEL codes: C72 - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:00
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:22139
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3201

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