Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: the Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility

Evans, Bob and Reiche, Soenje (2008) Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: the Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility. Economics Letters, vol. 99 (n° 3). pp. 611-614.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/10623
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: June 2008
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:59
Last Modified: 29 Mar 2018 13:49
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:10623
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3116

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