Universal Intellectual Property Rights: Too Much of a Good Thing?

Auriol, Emmanuelle, Biancini, Sara and Paillacar, Rodrigo (2019) Universal Intellectual Property Rights: Too Much of a Good Thing? TSE Working Paper, n. 19-987, Toulouse

Download (513kB) | Preview
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/27977


Developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) are studied in a model of vertical innovation. Enforcing IPR boosts export opportunities to advanced economies but slows down technological transfers and incentives to invest in R&D. Asymmetric protection of IPR, strict in the North and lax in the South, leads in many cases to a higher world level of innovation than universal enforcement. IPR enforcement is U-shaped in the relative size of the export market compared to the domestic one: rich countries and small/poor countries enforce IPR, the former to protect their innovations, the latter to access foreign markets, while large emerging countries free-ride on rich countries' technology to serve their internal demand.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: January 2019
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, Imitation, Duopoly, Developing Countries
JEL codes: F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations; International Trade Organizations
F15 - Economic Integration
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
O31 - Innovation and Invention - Processes and Incentives
O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 30 Jan 2019 10:48
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 10:48
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:27977
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/31039

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item


Downloads per month over past year