Organizing Competition for the Market

Iossa, Elisabetta, Rey, Patrick and Waterson, Michael (2019) Organizing Competition for the Market. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-984, Toulouse

[img]
Preview
Text
Download (483kB) | Preview
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/33261

Abstract

The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that the timing of tenders should depend on the likelihood of monopolization. When monopolization is expected, synchronous tendering is preferable, as it strengthens the pressure that entrants exercise on the monopolist. When instead other firms remain active, staggered tendering is preferable, as it maximizes the competitive pressure that comes from the other firms.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: January 2019
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Dynamic procurement, incumbency advantage, local monopoly, competition, asymmetric auctions, synchronous contracts, staggered contracts
JEL codes: D44 - Auctions
H40 - General
H57 - Procurement
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L51 - Economics of Regulation
R48 - Government Pricing; Regulatory Policies
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2019 15:07
Last Modified: 28 Jun 2019 09:36
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:33261
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/30827

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year