Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition

Correia da silva, Joao, Jullien, Bruno, Lefouili, Yassine and Pinho, Joana (2018) Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-946, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32901

Abstract

This paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two-sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of "average-marginal-cost-preserving" mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: August 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Mergers, Multi-Sided Platforms, Cournot Competition
JEL codes: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 05 Sep 2018 07:32
Last Modified: 20 Nov 2018 13:27
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32901
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26215

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