Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information

Yamashita, Takuro (2018) Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-937, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32880

Abstract

This paper considers auction environments with a (possibly correlated) common prior over bidders' values, where each bidder may have additional information (e.g., through information acquisition). Under certain conditions, we characterize the optimal mechanisms in terms of the expected revenue that is guaranteed given whatever additional information is available to the bidders. Even if the values are correlated,we do not necessarily have full-surplus extraction, and moreover, the optimal mechanism resembles those in the independently distributed cases. Specifically, we show that (i) a second-price auction is optimal among all the efficient mechanisms, and (ii) it is rate-optimal among all the mechanisms.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: July 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Mechanism design, Auction, Correlated private information, Information acquisition, Revenue guarantee
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 25 Jul 2018 07:32
Last Modified: 25 Jul 2018 07:32
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32880
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26151

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