Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts

Cheikbossian, Guillaume and Fayat, Romain (2018) Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-918, Toulousse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32635

Abstract

We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual e¤orts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: May 2018
Place of Publication: Toulousse
Uncontrolled Keywords: group size paradox, group contest, complementarity, (impure) public good
JEL codes: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 03 May 2018 12:40
Last Modified: 15 Jul 2019 12:07
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32635
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25978

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