Who Should Pay the Sports Agent’s Commission? An Economic Analysis of Setting the Legal Rules in the Regulation of Matchmakers

Brocard, Jean-François and Cavagnac, Michel (2017) Who Should Pay the Sports Agent’s Commission? An Economic Analysis of Setting the Legal Rules in the Regulation of Matchmakers. International Journal of Sport Finance, 12 (1). pp. 65-88.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31647

Abstract

We study the effects of completing the legal framework of matchmakers with a rule designating which party must pay the commission. The paper examines the two rules currently open to debate at the international level in sport: the "player-pays" principle and the "club-pays" principle. We find that the most appropriate measure entails designating the party with the lesser bargaining power to pay the intermediary’s fee. However, our main result indicates that the appropriateness of imposing an additional rule in the legal framework is a preliminary issue. Indeed, even if the best rule is chosen, welfare may be decreased by this legal initiative.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: February 2017
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Sport intermediaries, Matching, Regulation through rules, Legal framework for contracts
JEL codes: C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 27 Apr 2018 07:44
Last Modified: 27 Apr 2018 07:44
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:31647
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25962

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