Imperfect Financial Markets and Shareholder Incentives in Partial and General Equilibrium

Albagli, Elias, Hellwig, Christian and Tsyvinski, Aleh (2018) Imperfect Financial Markets and Shareholder Incentives in Partial and General Equilibrium. TSE Working Paper, n. 18-891, Toulouse

[img]
Preview
Text
Download (980kB) | Preview
Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32475

Abstract

We analyze the firm-level and aggregate consequences of equity market imperfections in the form of noisy information aggregation for corporate risk-taking and investment. Market imperfections cause controlling shareholders to invest too much in upside risks and too little in downside risks in an attempt to capture market rents. In partial equilibrium, these inefficiencies are particularly severe if upside risks are coupled with near constant returns to scale. In general equilibrium, the shareholders' collective attempts to boost shareholder value of individual firms leads to a novel pecuniary externality that amplifies investment distortions with downside risks but offsets distortions with upside risks, thereby overturning the results from the partial equilibrium analysis. We consider policy interventions to correct the distortions, and show that in general equilibrium such interventions disrupt the financial market's allocational role. We analyze extensions of our model to excess leverage, agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, negative welfare effects of transparency, excess sensitivity of investment to stock prices, and dynamically inconsistent firm behavior.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: February 2018
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 24 Apr 2018 09:40
Last Modified: 15 Jul 2019 13:15
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32475
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25854

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year