The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting

Gehrlein, William, Le Breton, Michel and Lepelley, Dominique (2017) The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting. Social Choice and Welfare, 49. pp. 315-321.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32039

Abstract

The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2017
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Condorcet, Separable preferences, Logrolling, Vote Trading
JEL codes: D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 13 Apr 2018 08:11
Last Modified: 20 Jul 2018 09:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:32039
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25685

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