Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties

Novaes, Lucas (2018) Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties. American Journal Of Political Science, 62 (1). pp. 84-98.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31969

Abstract

This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinctive brands, organization, and activists to mobilize individuals, parties “hire” local notables to broker votes among a local, nonpartisan constituency. However, brokers may be unreliable agents, regularly changing political allegiances in search of better returns for their brokerage among the module of voters they control. This free agency from brokers hinders durable party–voter linkages and results in electorally vulnerable parties. Measuring how brokers influence parties is empirically complex, but taking advantage of the fact that in Brazil these agents are also local candidates, this article demonstrates the negative electoral consequences of brokers' free agency on party performance. Natural experiments and an unexpected, temporary institutional reform that discouraged disloyalty for brokers demonstrate this relationship.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: January 2018
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
D- SCIENCES POLITIQUES
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 07 May 2018 14:53
Last Modified: 07 May 2018 14:53
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:31969
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25678

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