Allocating essential inputs

Rey, Patrick and Salant, David (2017) Allocating essential inputs. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-820, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31784

Abstract

Regulators must often allocate essential inputs, such as spectrum rights, transmission capacity or airport landing slots, which can transform the structure of the downstream market. These decisions involve a trade-off, as provisions aimed at fostering competition and lowering prices for consumers, also tend to limit the proceeds from the sale of the inputs. We first characterize the optimal allocation, from the standpoints of consumer and total welfare. We then note that standard auctions yield substantially different outcomes. Finally, we show how various regulatory instruments can be used to implement the desired allocation.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: June 2017
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Auctions, Market design, Essential inputs, Regulation, Antitrust
JEL codes: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D44 - Auctions
D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L51 - Economics of Regulation
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Apr 2018 14:00
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2018 14:00
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:31784
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25624

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