An Equilibrium Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities

Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2006) An Equilibrium Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities. Journal of Public Economics, 90 (10). pp. 2091-2106.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/5656
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2006
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:54
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:21
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:5656
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2383

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