How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games?

Hörner, Johannes and Takahashi, Satoru (2017) How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games? TSE Working Paper, n. 17-792, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31602
Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: March 2017
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Repeated games, rates of convergence
JEL codes: C72 - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 29 Mar 2017 09:19
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:24
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:31602
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/23337

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