Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

Mathis, Jérôme (2008) Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion. Journal of Economic Theory, 143. pp. 571-584.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/20707
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2008
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: Toulouse School of Economics - TSE
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:53
Last Modified: 18 Oct 2017 15:17
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:20707
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2312

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