Second-degree Price Discrimination by a Two-sided Monopoly Platform

Jeon, Doh-Shin, Kim, Byung-Cheol and Menicucci, Domenico (2016) Second-degree Price Discrimination by a Two-sided Monopoly Platform. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-690, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30705

Abstract

We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The incentive of the agents on the value creation side may conflict with the platform’s incentive to internalize externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal. Even without such conflict, pooling can be optimal due to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agent diverge from those of the average agent on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination. We provide an application to an optimal design of privacy and advertising policies for a platform mediating consumers and advertisers.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: September 2016
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: platform, price discrimination, two-sided markets, non-responsiveness, Spence effect.
JEL codes: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
M3 - Marketing and Advertising
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 06 Sep 2016 08:11
Last Modified: 23 May 2019 10:31
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:30705
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22343

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