Social norms and economic incentives in firms

Kubler, Dorothea, Weibull, Jörgen W. and Huck, Steffen (2012) Social norms and economic incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 83. pp. 173-185.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26389

Abstract

This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’ desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team
production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the contract. Multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper
incentives can arise.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2012
Refereed: Yes
JEL codes: D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 19 Jul 2016 14:00
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26389
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22219

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