Political Capital in the 21st Century

Klingler, Jonathan (2014) Political Capital in the 21st Century: An Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private. IAST working paper, n. 15-19, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://iast.fr/pub/29070

Abstract

The Bush and Obama administrations have complemented their capacity to make public appeals by creating grassroots lobbying organizations with the explicit purpose of mobilizing supporters to pressure Congress to pass presidential policy priorities. This paper advances the study of organizations like Organizing for Action by considering their ability to make targeted appeals to the primary electorate of the president's party as well as orchestrate indirect mass persuasion campaigns. Furthermore, this paper defines the costs of lobbying in terms of those tactics' electoral costs. I present a model which predicts that targeted appeals will be more common under unified government and that mass persuasion attempts will be less common as the organizational capital of these organizations can be efficiently applied to electoral ends. The model also predicts that public appeals become less common as the time costs and relative electoral productivity of presidential time increase. I find empirical support for these hypotheses in data obtained from emails sent by Organizing for America/Organizing for Action to subscribers since its creation in early 2009 and in presidential primetime addresses made since 1957.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Sub-title: An Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private
Language: English
Date: December 2014
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2016 08:25
Last Modified: 30 May 2018 06:42
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:29070
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/21629

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