Are we more wearful than greedy? Outbounding the incentives to defect in cooperation dilemmas

Mantilla, Cesar (2014) Are we more wearful than greedy? Outbounding the incentives to defect in cooperation dilemmas. IAST working paper, n. 14-08, Toulouse

[img]
Preview
Text
Download (584kB) | Preview
Official URL: http://iast.fr/pub/28189

Abstract

Previous studies analyzing the impact of payoffs' cardinality in cooperation dilemmas have concluded that the additional benefits of defecting against a cooperator (the greed dimension) are more salient than the additional costs of cooperating against a defector (the fear dimension). We conduct an experiment to show that when the costs of cooperation exceed its gains, this pattern is reversed. The larger impact of fear over greed on the likelihood to defect is robust to random rematching and to repeated matching, and is mostly driven by a relative rather than an absolute perception of the incentives to cooperate across different dilemmas.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: April 2014
Place of Publication: Toulouse
JEL codes: C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2016 08:19
Last Modified: 30 May 2018 06:40
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:28189
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/21618

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year