Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule

Le Breton, Michel, Lepelley, Dominique and Smaoui, Hatem (2016) Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 64. pp. 11-22.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30405

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule for a class of random electorate models encompassing the celebrated Impartial Culture (IC) and Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) models. The emphasis is on the impact of correlation across votes on the order of magnitude of this event. Our proof techniques use arguments from probability theory on one hand and combinatorial and algorithmic tools for counting integer points inside convex polytopes on the other hand.

Item Type: Article
Language: French
Date: May 2016
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Elections, Power Measurement, Voting, Random Electorate
JEL codes: D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 15 Apr 2016 14:28
Last Modified: 20 Jul 2018 09:05
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:30405
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/21443

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