A Passion for Voting

Panova, Elena (2015) A Passion for Voting. Games and Economic Behavior, 90. pp. 44-65.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28913


We model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters. A voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it. We find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting. Public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects. When the signal is sufficiently strong, the majority outcome is biased. This is a possible reason for persistence of public policies.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: March 2015
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Expressive voting, Self-signaling, Ignorant voting, Habitual voting, Bandwagon and underdog effects, Information aggregation in elections, Status quo bias
JEL codes: D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
P16 - Political Economy
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Apr 2016 11:15
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:28913
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/20311

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