Conditional rewards for sustainable behavior: targeting lessons from an open access fishery

Hopfensitz, Astrid, Mantilla, Cesar and Miquel-Florensa, Josepa (2016) Conditional rewards for sustainable behavior: targeting lessons from an open access fishery. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-633, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30371

Abstract

We design and conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to test the effect of a conditional contract on the sustainability of an open access fishery, where unit prices are conditional on aggregate catch. The contract provides collective incentives to decrease extraction but maintain the individual incentives of extraction maximization. We conduct the experiment with two communities of artisanal fishermen differing in their market and technological restrictions. We find that the conditional contract, compared to a fixed price scheme, increases efficiency, the duration of the resource and the total yield. The contract has a greater effect upon groups from the less restricted community.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: March 2016
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Artifactual field experiment, dynamic resource, artisanal fishery, stochastic production function
JEL codes: C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
Q22 - Fishery; Aquaculture
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 21 Mar 2016 14:08
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:30371
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/20156

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