Ivaldi, Marc and Lagos, Vicente (2016) Assessment of Post-merger Coordinated Effects: Characterization by Simulations. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-631, Toulouse

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Abstract

This paper aims to evaluate the coordinated effects of horizontal mergers by simulating its impact on firms’ critical discount factors. The simulation setting considers a model with a random coefficient discrete choice demand and heterogeneous price-setting firms on the supply side. The results suggest that mergers strengthen the incentives to collude among merging parties, but weaken the incentives of non-merging parties. In addition, while the magnitude of this impact is moderate for the latter, it can be substantial for merging parties. Finally, general policy lessons regarding the assessment of the magnitude of these effects can be drawn from the results.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: March 2016
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Assessment, Collusion, Coordinated effects, Critical Discount Factor, Merger Simulation
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 15 Mar 2016 10:42
Last Modified: 28 Jun 2021 14:33
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:30295
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/19986

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