Key-drivers of EU budget allocation: Does power matter?

García-Valiñas, Maria A., Kurz, S. and Zaporozhets, Vera (2016) Key-drivers of EU budget allocation: Does power matter? European Journal of Political Economy, 43. pp. 57-70.

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We examine the determinants of the EU budget expenditures allocation among different countries. Following previous literature, we consider two alternative explanations for the EU budget distribution: political power vs. 'needs view'. Taking the original data set (1976-2001) from Kauppi and Widgren (2004) we analyze whether their predictions stay robust while applying a different measure of power. We find that the nucleolus is a good alternative to the Shapley-Shubik index in the distributive situations such as the EU budget allocation. Our results also show that the relative weight of political power when explaining budget shares is lower than previous models' predictions.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: June 2016
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: EU policies, budget allocation, political power, nucleolus, Shapley-Shubik index
JEL codes: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H61 - Budget; Budget Systems
O52 - Europe
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 22 Apr 2016 12:59
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23

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