The Condorcet Principle Implies the Proxy Voting Paradox

Le Breton, Michel (2016) The Condorcet Principle Implies the Proxy Voting Paradox. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-619

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30129

Abstract

In this note, we formulate a condition describing the vulnerability of a social choice function to a specific kind of strategic behavior and show that two well known classes of choice functions suffer from it.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: February 2016
Uncontrolled Keywords: Condorcet, Departing Voter Paradox, Backward Induction
JEL codes: D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 12 Feb 2016 13:45
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:30129
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/19535

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