Belan, Pascal, Carré, Martine and Gregoir, Stéphane (2010) Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market. Labour Economics, 17 (5). pp. 776-788.

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.04.003

Abstract

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers. We first give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: October 2010
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Matching, Taxation, Unemployment policy
JEL Classification: H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
J41 - Contracts - Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
J68 - Public Policy
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 22 Apr 2016 14:56
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:51
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:30088
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/19387
View Item