Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée

Avenel, Eric and Caprice, Stéphane (2015) Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée. TSE Working Paper, n. 15-613

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29970

Abstract

We analyze the impact of an entry threat at the downstream level on the ability of a pair of vertically integrated incumbents to collude. Entrants depend on the vertically integrated firms on the intermediate market for the purchasing of good. While the entry threat leaves collusion profits unchanged, we show that deviation profits are also unchanged and that profits are lower in the punishment periods. Consequently, an entry threat facilitates collusion, thus benefiting to incumbents.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: French
Date: November 2015
Uncontrolled Keywords: collusion, intégration verticale, entrée, exclusion
JEL codes: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L23 - Organization of Production
L40 - General
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2016 12:56
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:29970
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/19159

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