Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective

He, Yinghua, Li, Sanxi and Yan, Jianye (2015) Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective. Economics Letters, vol. 133. pp. 40-44.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29515

Abstract

All (random) assignments/allocations without transfers can be considered as market outcomes with personalized prices and an equal income. Prices proportional across agents imply efficiency; common prices lead to efficiency and envy-freeness. This market perspective also reveals a weakness of envy-freeness.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2015
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Allocation without transfers, competitive equilibrium, equal incomes, market perspective, envy-free, Pareto efficient, coalitional-envy-free
JEL codes: C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2015 13:08
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:29515
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18419

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