Dessi, Roberta and Piccolo, Salvatore (2015) Merchant Guilds, Taxation and Social Capital. TSE Working Paper, n. 15-581

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Abstract

We develop a theory of the emergence of merchant guilds as an efficient mechanism to foster cooperation between merchants and rulers, building on the complementarity between merchant guilds’ ability to enforce monopoly over trade and their social capital. Unlike existing models, we focus on local merchant guilds, rather than alien guilds, accounting for the main observed features of their behavior, internal organization and relationship with rulers. Our model delivers novel predictions about the emergence, variation, functioning, and eventual decline of this highly successful historical form of network. Our theory reconciles previous explanations and the large body of historical evidence on medieval merchant guilds. In doing so, we also shed novel light on the role of the guilds’ social capital, and its importance for taxation, welfare, and the development of towns and their government in medieval Europe.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: May 2015
Uncontrolled Keywords: Merchant guild, Social capital, collusion, Political economy, Trade, Taxation
JEL Classification: L20 - General
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
N7 - Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, Technology, and Other Services
N8 - Micro-Business History
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2015 13:08
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:49
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:29364
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18333

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