Lobbying, family concerns and the lack of political support for estate taxation

De Donder, Philippe and Pestieau, Pierre (2015) Lobbying, family concerns and the lack of political support for estate taxation. Economics & Politics, vol. 27 (n° 3). pp. 389-403.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29311


We provide an explanation for why estate taxation is surprisingly little used over the world, given the skewness of the estate distribution. Taxing estates implies meddling with intra-family decisions, which may be frown upon by many. At the same time, the concentration of estates means that a low proportion of the population stands to gain a lot by decreasing estate taxation. We provide an analytical model, together with numerical simulations, where agents bequeathing large estates make monetary contributions that are used to play up the salience of the encroachment aspects of estate taxation on family decisions in order to decrease its political support.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2015
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: estate taxation, family values, political economy, lobbying, Kantian equilibrium
JEL codes: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H31 - Household
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2015 13:08
Last Modified: 24 Jan 2019 00:11
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:29311
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16908

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