A Model of Smiling as a Costly Signal of Cooperation Opportunities

Centorrino, Samuele, Djemaï, Elodie, Hopfensitz, Astrid, Milinski, Manfred and Seabright, Paul (2015) A Model of Smiling as a Costly Signal of Cooperation Opportunities. Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology, 1. pp. 325-340.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29278
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: September 2015
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Smiling, Costly signaling, Experiment, Trust game
JEL codes: D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
D85 - Network Formation and Analysis - Theory
D87 - Neuroeconomics
Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2015 13:08
Last Modified: 24 Jan 2019 00:11
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:29278
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16892

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