Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination

Lopez, Angel and Rey, Patrick (2016) Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination. Journal of Industrial Economics, 64 (3). pp. 436-465.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29201

Abstract

This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tarifs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. When access charges are high, this allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way if switching costs are sufficiently large. In the absence of termination-based price discrimination, however, such foreclosure strategies are not profitable.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: September 2016
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2015 13:08
Last Modified: 26 Mar 2018 08:47
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:29201
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16873

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