Standard-Essential Patents

Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean (2015) Standard-Essential Patents. Journal of Political Economy, 123 (3). pp. 547-586.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28556

Abstract

A major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex-ante not that important may, by being included into a standard, become standard-essential patents (SEPs). In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most standard-setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms. Such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to intense litigation activity. This paper builds a framework for the analysis of SEPs, identifies several types of inefficiencies attached to the lack of price commitment, shows how structured price commitments restore competition, and analyzes whether price commitments are likely to emerge in the marketplace.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: June 2015
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Standards, licensing commitments, standard-essential patents, royalty stacking, FRAND, hold ups and reverse hold ups
JEL codes: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L24 - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:50
Last Modified: 24 Jan 2019 00:10
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:28556
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16595

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