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Evolutionarily stable strategies, preferences and moral values, in n-player Interactions

Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2014) Evolutionarily stable strategies, preferences and moral values, in n-player Interactions. LERNA Working Paper, n. 14-07-408

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28495

Abstract

We provide a generalized definition of evolutionary stability of heritable types in arbitrarily large symmetric interactions under random matching that may be assortative. We establish stability results when these types are strategies in games, and when they are preferences or moral values in games under incomplete information. We show that a class of moral preferences, with degree of morality equal to the index of assortativity are evolutionarily stable. In particular, selfishness is evolutionarily unstable when there is positive assortativity in the matching process. We establish that evolutionarily stable strategies are the same as those played in equilibrium by rational but partly morally motivated individuals, individuals with evolutionarily stable preferences. We provide simple and operational criteria for evolutionary stability and apply these to canonical examples.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: June 2014
Uncontrolled Keywords: Evolutionary stability, assortativity, morality, homo moralis, public goods, contests, helping, Cournot competition
JEL codes: C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior - Underlying Principles
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:50
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:28495
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16578

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