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Farhi, Emmanuel
and Tirole, Jean
(2015)
Liquid Bundles.
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 158.
pp. 634-655.
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28194
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.002
Abstract
Parties in financial markets, industries, compensation design or politics may negotiate on either a piecemeal or a bundled basis. Little is known about the desirability of bundling when values are common and/or information endogenous. The paper shows that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby facilitating trade. It accordingly revisits and qualifies existing knowledge on security design.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | July 2015 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Liquidity, security design, tranching, information acquisition |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information E51 - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers G12 - Asset Pricing; Trading volume; Bond Interest Rates G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2015 14:46 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Nov 2023 10:39 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:28194 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16519 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Liquid Bundles. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:28)
- Liquid Bundles. (deposited 16 Mar 2015 14:46) [Currently Displayed]
