An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals

Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco, Garcia-Gallego, Aurora, Georgantzis, Nikolaos and Montesano, Aldo (2011) An Experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals. LERNA Working Paper, n. 11.23.357

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/25432

Abstract

We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a
cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Date: December 2011
Uncontrolled Keywords: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Bargaining, Confirmed Proposals, Confirmed Agreement, Tacit Communication
JEL codes: C72 - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:19
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:25432
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16431

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