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Cremer, Helmuth and De Donder, Philippe (2014) Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-496
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Abstract
Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non-contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | May 2014 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | generosity, redistributiveness, pay-as-you-go pensions, collective annuity, longevity, Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium |
| JEL Classification: | D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 18:15 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Mar 2018 13:23 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:7636 |
| URI: | http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16202 |
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- Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 18:15) [Currently Displayed]
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