College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals

Carvalho, José-Raimundo, Magnac, Thierry and Xiong, Qizhou (2014) College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-506, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/28351

Abstract

We evaluate a simple allocation mechanism of students to majors at college entry that was commonly used in universities in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s. Students first chose a single major and then took exams that select them in or out of the chosen major. The literature analyzing student placement, points out that this decentralized mechanism is not stable and is not strategy-proof. This means that some pairs of major & students can be made better off and that students tend to disguise their preferences using such a mechanism. We build up a model of performance and school choices in which expectations are carefully specified and we estimate it using cross-section data reporting choices between two medical schools and grade performances at the entry exams. Given those estimates, we evaluate changes in selection and students'expected utilities when other mechanisms are implemented. Results highlight the importance of strategic motives and redistributive effects of changes of the allocation mechanisms.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: June 2014
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Education, two-sided matching, school allocation mechanism, policy evaluation
JEL codes: I21 - Analysis of Education
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:46
Last Modified: 19 Nov 2018 15:47
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:28351
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15954

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