Ambec, Stefan and Kervinio, Yann (2014) Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility. TSE Working Paper, n. 14-480, Toulouse

Warning
There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of Ambec_15873.pdf]
Preview
Text
Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

We consider the decentralized provision of a global public good with local external- ities in a spatially explicit model. Communities decide on the location of a facility that benefits everyone but exhibits costs to the host and its neighbors. They share the costs through transfers. We examine the cooperative game associated with this so-called NIMBY ("Not In My Back-Yard") problem. We derive and discuss conditions for core solutions to exist. These conditions are driven by the temptation to exclude groups of neighbors at any potential location. We illustrate the results in different spatial settings. In particular, we construct a hypothetical example on a real administrative unit in which the core is shown to be empty. These results clarify how property rights can affect cooperation and shed further light on a limitation of the Coase theorem.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 26 March 2014
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: NIMBY, externality, Coase theorem, pollution, waste, core, cooperative game, spatial model
JEL Classification: C71 - Cooperative Games
D62 - Externalities
Q53 - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
R53 - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:43
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:48
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:28041
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15873

Available Versions of this Item

View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year