Non-Obviousness and Screening

Kou, Zonglai, Rey, Patrick and Wang, Tong (2013) Non-Obviousness and Screening. Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.61 (n°3). pp. 700-732.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/27980

Abstract

The paper offers a novel justification for the non-obviousness patentability requirement. An innovation involves two stages: research results in a technology blueprint, which development transforms into a profitable activity. An innovator, who is either efficient or inefficient, must rely on outside finance for the development. Only patented technologies are developed. Strengthening the non-obviousness requirement alleviates adverse selection by discouraging inefficient innovators from doing research, but creates inefficiencies by excluding marginal innovations. We show that it is socially optimal to raise the non-obviousness requirement so as to exclude bad innovators; we also provide several robustness checks and discuss the policy implications.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: September 2013
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:42
Last Modified: 09 Apr 2018 09:10
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:27980
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15860

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