Lobbying, family concerns and the lack of political support for estate taxation

De Donder, Philippe and Pestieau, Pierre (2013) Lobbying, family concerns and the lack of political support for estate taxation. TSE Working Paper, n. 13-454

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/27797

Abstract

We provide an explanation for why estate taxation is surprisingly little used over the world, given the skewness of the estate distribution. Taxing estates implies meddling with intra-family decisions, which may be frown upon by many. At the same time, the concentration of estates means that a low proportion of the population stands to gain a lot by decreasing estate taxation. We provide an analytical model, together with numerical simulations, where agents bequeathing large estates make monetary contributions that are used to play up the salience of the encroachment aspects of estate taxation on family decisions in order to decrease its political support.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: December 2013
Uncontrolled Keywords: estate taxation, family values, political economy, lobbying, Kantian equilibrium
JEL codes: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H31 - Household
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:40
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:27797
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15792

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