Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement Bargaining Models

Daughety, Andrew F. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (2013) Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement Bargaining Models. , Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/27402

Abstract

We discuss the implications of various models of settlement negotiations for the revelation or suppression of private information held by the parties. This information may be relevant to multiple audiences, including those involved in the instant lawsuit; other potential litigants that may subsequently make use of the information in their own suits against one of the parties; and more distant observers and users of the legal process. We also examine how rules of evidence and rules of civil procedure can sometimes result in different degrees of purposeful or (arguably) unintended information suppression.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: June 2013
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:37
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2018 14:51
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:27402
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15678

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