A Competitive Approach to Leadership in Public Good Games

Centorrino, Samuele and Concina, Laura (2013) A Competitive Approach to Leadership in Public Good Games. TSE Working Paper, n. 13-383, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26933


We show that introducing a competitive preliminary stage in a sequential public good game
helps select one of the more cooperative leaders in the group. Using a modified second
price auction, we find that bids have a strong positive predictive power on individual contributions.
Moreover, evidence is provided that trust can explain voluntary and cooperative
leadership. However, followers reaction to voluntary leaders may rise free riding behaviour,
with uncertain effect on total public good provision.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: February 2013
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Public good experiment Leadership Self-selection Cooperation Trust Public good provision
JEL codes: A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:33
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2018 14:31
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26933
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15533

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