Public goods games, altruism, and evolution

Alger, Ingela (2010) Public goods games, altruism, and evolution. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12 (4). pp. 789-813.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26840

Abstract

I analyze the evolution of altruistic preferences in a population
where individuals are matched pairwise to play a
one-shot public goods game. I determine the evolutionarily
stable degree of altruism, allowing for assortative matching.
The stable degree of altruism is strictly smaller than the degree
of assortativity. In particular, if matching is completely
random, spite is stable, and a positive degree of assortativity
is necessary for pure selfishness to be stable. Furthermore,
the stable degree of altruism is increasing in the degree of
assortativity, and it depends on the specifics of the public
goods game.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: August 2010
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:33
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:26840
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15516

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